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Abstract
Several projects propose an information centric approach to the network of
the future. Such an approach makes efficient content distribution possible by
making information retrieval host-independent and integration into the network
storage for caching information. Requests for particular content can, thus, be
satisfied by any host or server holding a copy. One well-established approach
of information centric networks is the Network of Information (NetInf) archi-
tecture, developed as part of the EU FP7 project SAIL. The approach is based
on the Publish/Subscribe model, where hosts can join a network, publish data,
and subscribe to publications. The NetInf introduces two main stages namely,
the Publication and Data Retrieval through which hosts publish and retrieve
data. Also, a distributed Name Resolution System (NRS) has been introduced
to map the data to its publishers. The NRS is vulnerable to masquerading and
content poisoning attacks through invalid data registration. Therefore, the pa-
per proposes a Registration stage to take place before the publication and data
retrieval stage. This new stage will identify and authenticate hosts before be-
ing able to access the NetInf system. Furthermore, the Registration stage uses
(cap)abilities-based access policy to mitigate the issue of unauthorized access to
data objects. The proposed solutions have been formally verified using formal
methods approach.
Keywords: Network of Information, Information Centric Networks, Formal
Methods, Authentication, Authorization
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1. Introduction
Information-Centric Networking (ICN) is an emerging paradigm envisaged
by a growing body of researchers. ICN architectures leverage the role of in-
formation as the building block of the Internet architecture as opposed to the
current end-host oriented paradigm. ICN architectures have better support for5
multicast, mobility, and security [1]. In ICN architectures, efficient information
dissemination is expected to be supported by dispersing an information item
in many network locations using in-network caches and Content Distribution
Networks (CDNs) [2].
The Network of Information architecture is an ICN approach developed as10
part of the Scalable and Adaptive Internet Solutions (SAIL) project [3]. The
SAIL NetInf project is centred around a well-defined set of architecture invari-
ants (such as unique naming, location-independence and a strict information-
centric service model) and puts particular emphasis on supporting multi-technology
/multi-domain interoperability [4]. The project also takes into account devel-15
opments elsewhere in ICN research (e.g., Content Centric Networking (CCN),
Data-Oriented Network Architecture (DONA) and Publish-Subscribe Internet-
working Routing Paradigm (PSIRP)) [5] [6] [4].
In NetInf, data objects such as web pages, articles or videos are named and
identified using the Uniform Resource Identifier for Named Information (URI-ni)20
format [7], hence these objects are referred to as Named Data Objects (NDOs).
The NetInf architecture is composed of three main components:
• The Publishers: These are NetInf nodes acting as source of NDOs and
willing to make these objects accessible to subscribers.
• The Subscribers (or Requesters): These are NetInf nodes that request25
specific NDOs.
• The NetInf System: This is represented as a network of NetInf rout-
ing/forwarding nodes, spanning over the inter-domain topology along which
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payload data is delivered. Three types of nodes are needed for the opera-
tion of the NetInf system: (1) cache-capable nodes to support the function-30
ality of in-network caching of NDOs (2) Name-Based routers which route
and forward NDOs towards subscribers (3) the Name Resolution System
(NRS) is a distributed system which is aware of the network locations
where an NDO might potentially be available for retrieval
Generally speaking, the operation of the NetInf architecture goes through two35
stages: the Publication Stage, where publishers publish their NDOs to the Net-
Inf system. The Data Retrieval Stage, where subscribers request specific NDOs
from the NetInf system. The requested NDOs will be then forwarded to towards
the requesting subscribers. These two stages will be explained in section 2.
Currently, the research concentrates mainly on defining the NetInf overall40
architecture as well as the structure of the NetInf messages such as the Get-Req/
Get-Resp and Publish-Req/Publish-Resp (more details about these messages in
Section 2). The security-related research is still at the stage of defining threat
models, highlighting various possible attacks as in [3] and defining basic security
measures as part of the URI-ni naming scheme [7]. Therefore, this paper intro-45
duces a new approach to address the authentication and authorization issues of
implementing the NetInf architecture.
Our main concern here is the security of the Publication Stage, where pub-
lishers publish NDOs to the NetInf system. Another major concern is to address
the issue of unauthorized access to published NDOs. For a secure publication,50
two requirements need to be verified namely, the authenticity of publishers and
the validity of the published NDOs. Indeed, a malicious node might spoof an-
other publisher ID and publish invalid NDOs. This is very similar to poisoning
attacks against Domain Name Server (DNS) or routing tables [8]. To stop such
attacks, we need to thwart masquerading threats; therefore, a pre-publication55
stage, called Registration Stage, is proposed in this paper. During the Regis-
tration Stage, both publishers and subscribers need to authenticate themselves
with the NetInf system. Therefore, as part of the Registration Stage, we propose
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a new authentication protocol based on the ID-Based Cryptography (IBC) [9].
The IBC helps to certify the messages sender as the real owner of the NDO60
that will update the NetInf system. The main advantage of using the IBC over
traditional Public Key Infrastructure is that since the public key will be derived
from the nodes’ identifiers, IBC eliminates the need for a public key distribution
infrastructure, details about IBC are in section 5.2.
To address the issue of an unauthorized access of NDOs, the paper will intro-65
duce an authorization and access control approach based on the (cap)abilities-
based access control policy [10] [11]. The (cap)abilities-based access control
policy has been used to secure the microkernel of the Valencia’s Simple Tasker
(VSTa) operating system. The proposed authorization (access control) approach
is integrated with the proposed authentication protocol as core components of70
the Registration Stage. tool [12]. In summary, the paper’s contribution is
to introduce an integrated authentication and authorization approach
that achieves the following:
• To verify the identity of data publishers and subscribers through
a novel ID-Based authentication protocol.75
• To tackle the issue of unauthorized access to published data by
using a cap(ability)-based access policy.
The proposed security measures have been verified using a formal
methods approach based on the Casper/FDR. The rest of this paper
is organized as follows: the NetInf system is described in Section 2. Section 380
defines the security problem of the Registration Stage of the NetInf. Section 4
describes some related work. The proposed Registration Stage along with the
authentication and authorization mechanisms are presented in Section 5. The
paper concludes in the conclusion section.
2. An Overview of the NetInf85
In NetInf architecture, publishers advertise potential publications in the Net-
Inf system and serve the data contents upon receiving requests. The NetInf sys-
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tem acts as a middleman between publishers and subscribers, and is involved in
configuring the forwarding path for data delivery [3]. Three pairs of messages
have been defined as part of the NetInf architecture:90
• The GET-REQ/GET-RESP messages: The GET message is used by a
requester to request an NDO from the NetInf network. A node responding
to the GET message would send a GET-RESP that is linked to the GET
request using the message-Id (msg-id) from the GET message.
• The PUBLISH-REQ/PUBLISH-RESP messages: The PUBLISH message95
allows a publisher to push the name and a copy of the NDO to the net-
work. A node receiving a PUBLISH message may choose to cache the
NDO according to local policy and availability of resources and returns
PUBLISH-RESP message, otherwise, it may choose to forward the mes-
sage to other nodes without sending the response message.100
• The SEARCH/SEARCH-RESP messages: The SEARCH message allows
the requester to send a set of query tokens containing search keywords.
The node that receives the SEARCH message, will either respond if the
NDO is in its own cache or forward the SEARCH message.
These messages are supposed to be transported over a Convergence Layer (CL)105
protocol. As stated in [4], no CL protocol has been defined yet, but any protocol
that allows NetInf messages to be passed without loss of information can be
used as a NetInf Convergence Layer (NetInf-CL) protocol. These three pairs of
message define the transactions of the Publication and Data Retrieval Stages as
follows:110
1. The Publish Stage: Publishers publish their NDOs to the NetInf system
by sending the PUBLISH-REQ message to the first hop node which might
choose to cache the included information and responds with a PUBLISH-
RESP message. Otherwise, it passes the PUBLISH-REQ to the next hop
route. A node that caches NDO might update the NRS with the location115
of the NDO.
5
Figure 1: The NetInf Message Flow. The Name Resolution mode (dashed Arrows). The
Name-Based Routing (solid Arrows)
2. The Data Retrieval Stage: As shown in Fig 1,The NetInf combines
two modes for data retrieval:
(a) The Name Resolution: In this mode, the publisher publishes an NDO
using PUBLISH message with a Name Resolution Service (NRS). In120
this case, a requester will approach the NRS first (using the GET
message) which will direct him to the information publisher.
(b) The Name-Based Routing: In this mode, the GET message will be
forwarded hop-by-hop between NetInf nodes until a cached copy of
the requested NDO is found or the original publisher is reached.125
3. Problem Definition
In NetInf, like other ICN architectures, the primary goal is to retrieve content
from the network, regardless of their locations. As described in the previous
section, the NetInf architecture has defined the required messages to publish
and retrieve NDOs. However, there is no specified approach to secure these130
messages, rather, security in NetInf is mainly based on object naming scheme.
6
With the NetInf naming scheme, each NDO is given a unique identifier (ID)
with cryptographic properties. Together with additional metadata, the ID can
be used to verify data integrity, owner authenticity and several other security
properties [13]. The scheme relies on proven mechanisms like cryptographic135
hashing and public-key certificate chains to reduce the risk of vulnerabilities. In
this sense, NetInf’s view of security is mainly focused on information security
regardless of the security of the underlying transport protocols.
The authors believe that the fact that despite the migration of the predom-
inant usage of the Internet from host-centric to the information-centric model,140
the underlying content delivery mechanism remains host-centric. As a conse-
quence, some conflicts arise due to the usage of host-centric mechanisms in an
information-centric networks, such as content identification and resolution, trust
establishment and security. Therefore, we believe in the need for a hybrid se-
curity approach that addresses security at both information and infrastructural145
levels.
As explained in the Introduction section, one serious threat against the Net-
Inf is when a fake publisher registers invalid NDOs with the NSR during the
Publication Stage. Obviously, this poisons the whole system, leads to invalid
responses to subscribers’ requests which is considered as a form of Denial of150
Service (DoS) attacks. Another threat is when unauthorized users get access
to data due to the lack of access control and authorization mechanisms. The
solution presented in this paper strives to address these issues by holding pub-
lishers and subscribers accountable for their actions and making sure that NDOs
could only be published and accessed by identified parties. To achieve this, our155
approach proposes that publishers and subscribers need initially to go through
a Registration Stage where they will be authenticated and given security to-
kens that define their permissions. The proposed authentication mechanisms in
the Registration Stage is based on the ID-Based Cryptography approach, while
the proposed authorization mechanism is based on the (cap)ability-based access160
control policy. After a successful registration, publishers and subscribers could
use the NetInf system to publish and request NDOs.
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4. Related Work
4.1. ID-Based Cryptography (IBC):
The IBC is a cryptographic scheme was first proposed by Adi Shamir [9]. The165
scheme enables users to communicate securely and verify each other’s signature
without exchanging public or private keys. However, the scheme requires the
presence of Trusted Key Generation (TKG) centres.
IBC’s Operation: Unlike the normal Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
where a TKG randomly generates pairs of public/private keys, each node in170
IBC chooses its identifier (address or name) as a public key. Practically, any
publicly known information that uniquely identifies the node could be used as
a public key. The TKG generates the corresponding private key and securely
distributes it to the node. When a node (A) wants to communicate with another
node (B), node A will sign the message using its private key and encrypt the175
result with the node B’s public key. Upon receiving the message, node B will
decrypt the message using its private key and verify the signature using node
A’s public key. The IBC represents an efficient and easy to implement system
which removes some of the overhead encountered in PKI for key management
and digital certificate issuance/revocation. However, the security of the IBC is180
based on the secrecy of the private key. To deal with this issue, the node needs
to combine additional information such as timestamps to their identifiers when
generating the public key. This procedure will guarantee a periodic update of
the public key. However, it introduces a key-management problem where all
users must have the most recent public key for the node.185
4.2. Authorization and Access Control
Most computer security uses the access control mode shown in fig 2, this
model comprises the following elements [14]
• Principals/Subjects: These are the source of access requests.
• Requests to perform operations on objects.190
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Figure 2: The Fundamental Model of Access Control
• A reference monitor: This is a guard for each object that examines access
requests for the object and decides whether to grant it.
• Objects: These represent resources such as files, devices, or processes.
The reference monitor bases its decision on the principal making the request,
the operation in the request, and an access rule that controls which principals195
may perform that operation on the object. To do its work the monitor needs
a trustworthy way to know both the source of the request (via authentication
process) and the access rule. Obtaining the source of the request is called
authentication; interpreting the access rule is called authorization. Thus au-
thentication answers the question ”Who said this?”, and authorization answers200
the question ”Who is trusted to access this?”. Usually the access rule is at-
tached to the object; such a rule is called an Access Control List or ACL. For
each operation the ACL specifies a set of authorized principals, and the monitor
grants a request if its principal is trusted at least as much as some principal that
is authorized to do the operation in the request [14].205
In the context of ICNs, access control policies are needed to guarantee that
NDOs could be published by authorized sources and the access to these NDOs
are only given to authorized subscribers.
4.3. Verifying Security Protocols using Casper/FDR:
Previously, analysing security protocols used to go through two stages. Firstly,210
modelling the protocol using a theoretical notation or language such as the
CSP [12]. Secondly, verifying the protocol using a model checker such as
Failures-Divergence Refinement (FDR) [15]. However, describing a system or
9
Table 1: THE HEADERS OF CASPER’S INPUT FILE
The Header Description
# Free Variables Defines the agents, variables and functions in the pro-
tocol
# Processes Represents each agent as a process
# Protocol Descrip-
tion
Shows all the messages exchanged between the agents
# Specification Specifies the security properties to be checked
# Actual Variables Defines the real variables, in the actual system to be
checked
# Functions Defines all the functions used in the protocol
# System Lists the agents participating in the actual system with
their parameters instantiated
# Intruder Informa-
tion
Specifies the intruder’s knowledge and capabilities
a protocol using CSP is a quite difficult and error-prone task; therefore, Gavin
Lowe has developed the CASPER/FDR tool to model security protocols, it215
accepts a simple and human-friendly input file that describes the system and
compiles it into CSP code which is then checked using the FDR model checker.
Casper/FDR has been used to model communication and security protocols as
in [16], [17]. The CASPER’s input file that describes the systems consists of
eight headers as explained in Table 1.220
5. The Proposed Solution
As discussed earlier, we propose a new stage to take place before the Publi-
cation and Data Retrieval stages. This section discusses our proposal of using
the IBC protocol to secure the Registration procedure of the NetInf.
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Figure 3: The Registration Stage
5.1. System Definition225
In NetInf, data sources publish NDOs by registering a name/locator binding
with the a NRS using the Publish message or announcing routing information in
a routing protocol. Any NetInf node holding a copy of the NDO can optionally
register the copy with the NRS. Subscribers will approach the NRS requesting
for a specific NDO, and the NRS will first resolve the NDO into a set of available230
locators and then retrieve the a copy of the data from best available source.
In order to provide a secure data publication and retrieval, we advocate the
need for a registration stage during which both publishers and subscribers need
to identify themselves to the NRS and acquire a security tokens that define
their privileges and access rights. Two types of security tokens namely, Object235
and Subject tokens are generated by the NRS. During the Registration Stage,
a node needs to disclose its role (publisher, subscriber or both) and after the
authentication process, it will receive corresponding tokens (subject, object or
both). The security tokens will define security levels for NDOs as for Objects
Tokens (ObjToken) and for subscribers as for Subject Tokens (SubToken). The240
rules of access will be checked and enforced by the NRS which will be acting as
a Reference Monitor, more details about the authorization and access control
approach is in section 5.3.
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5.2. The Proposed Authentication Protocol:
As shown in Fig 3, and based on the notations in Table 2, the secure Regis-245
tration Stage using the IBC goes as follows:
Msg1. TKG→ Pub : {SK(Pub)}{K1}
Msg2. TKG → NRS : {SK(NRS)}{K2}
The TKG provides the two communicating parties (Pub, NRS) with their250
private keys SK(Pub), SK(NRS) in messages 1 and 2. These messages are en-
crypted using the pre-shared secret keys K1, K2, respectively.
Msg3. Pub → NRS : {Reg-Req}{PK(NRS)}, {h(Reg-Req)}{SK(Pub)}
255
The Pub sends a Register-Request (Reg-Req) packet which includes infor-
mation about the node role (Pub or Sub) and a one-time message ID in Msg3.
The content of this message is encrypted using the NRS’s public key (which is
publicly known) and digitally signed using the private key of the Pub.
Msg4. NRS → Pub : {Reg-Resp, ObjToken}{PK(Pub)}, {h(Reg-Resp,260
ObjToken)}{SK(NRS)}
Upon receiving msg3, the NRS will use its private key SK(NRS) to decrypt
the message and then verify the signature using the Pub’s public key PK(Pub).
Finally, the NRS will hash the included Reg-Req and compare the result with265
the received signed value. Only if the two values are equal, the NRS composes a
Register-Response (Reg-Resp) packet as msg4 which includes the received mes-
sage ID (Msg-ID) and an Object Token (ObjToken). This message is encrypted
using the Pub’s public key and digitally signed using the NRS’s private key. The
Pub will check the included Msg-ID and only when the check succeeds, the Pub270
authenticates the NRS and accepts the token. The protocol’s steps are shown
in Fig 4.
It is worth to point out that the same proposed protocol should be used for
Registering subscribers before accessing NDOs. The only difference in this case
12
Figure 4: The Proposed Security Protocol
will be the use of Subject Token (SubToken) instead of the Object Token. At275
the end of the Registration Stage, the NRS will have a list of all authorized
subscribers and publishers.
5.2.1. Formal Analysis Using Casper/FDR:
To formally analyse the proposed solution, we simulate the system using
Casper/FDR tool. The eight headings of the simulated system are described280
below.
The #Free Variables section defines the variables and functions that are used
in the protocol. The term ”Free Variables” refers to the fact that these variables
will be represented by instances of actual values when running the protocol. For
instance, the variables na, nb, seq2, n1 are of type Nonce. The functions PK and285
SK return an agent’s public key and private key, respectively. These functions
will be defined later in the #Functions. The ”InverseKeys” keyword defines the
keys that are inverses of one another like PK and SK.
#Free variables
Pub, NRS : Agent290
na, nb, seq2, n1 : Nonce
MID: MessageID
SubToken: SubjectToken
ObjToken: ObjectToken
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Table 2: Notation
The Notation Definition
TKG The Trusted Ticket Granting
SK(Pub), SK(NRS) The Private keys of the Pub, NRS, respectively.
These keys are derived by the TKG
K1, K2 Pre-shared keys to secure the connections between
the TKG and Pub, NRS
Pub The data source or the publisher of NDO
NRS The Name Resolution Service which holds the
name/location binding for NDOs
ObjToken A security token will be attached to the published
NDO
SubToken A security token will be attached to the subscribers
MID Message-ID
h(m) Hash value of the message (m)
{m}{K} The message (m) being encrypted with the key (K)
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PK: Agent → PublicKey295
SK: Agent → PrivateKey
K1, K2: PreSharedKey
TKG: Server
m,m2, Ack: Messages
InverseKeys = (PK,SK), (K1, K1),(K2, K2)300
h : HashFunction
EIDPre: EIDPrefix
hash1: HashValues
The #Processes heading defines each involved agent in the protocol as a
CSP process. The keyword ”knows” defines the knowledge that the agent in305
question is expected to have at the beginning of the protocol run. In our sys-
tem, INITIATOR, RESPONDER and SERVER are the names of the process
representing the Publisher, the Name Resolution Service and the Trusted Ticket
Granting, respectively. The values within the brackets and after the ”knows”
keyword define the agents’ initial knowledge.310
#Processes
INITIATOR(Pub, NRS,TKG, K1,nb, m, MID) knows PK(Pub), PK(NRS), SK(Pub)
RESPONDER(NRS,TKG, K2, m2, SubToken, ObjToken) knows PK(Pub), PK(NRS),
SK(NRS)
SERVER(TKG, Pub, NRS, K1, K2, na) knows PK, SK(Pub), SK(NRS)315
The #Protocol description heading defines the system and the transactions
between the entities. It is worth pointing out that for security simulation we
need to explicitly define the security parameters. Therefore, we mention the
security-related contents such as the message ID (MID) and the object Token
(ObjToken) in msg 3, 4. Where (m) and (m1) refer to Register-Request and320
Register-Response packets, respectively.
#Protocol description
0. -> Pub : NRS, TKG
1. TKG -> Pub : {SK(Pub)}{K1}
2. TKG -> NRS : {SK(NRS)}{K2}325
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3. Pub -> NRS : {m,Pub, MID}{PK(NRS)}, {h(m, Pub, MID)}{SK(Pub)}%z
[decryptable(z, PK(Pub))]
4. NRS -> Pub : {m2, MID, ObjToken}{PK(Pub)}, {h(m2, MID, h(SubToken))}{SK(NRS)}%w
[decryptable(w, PK(NRS))]
The security requirements of the system are defined under the # Specifi-330
cation heading. The lines starting with the keyword Secret define the secrecy
properties of the protocol. The Secret(NRS, MID, [Pub]) specifies the MID as
a secret between the Pub and the NRS. The lines starting with Agreement de-
fine the protocol’s authenticity properties; for instance Agreement(NRS, Pub,
[MID]) specifies that, the NRS is correctly authenticated to the Pub using the335
message ID (MID). The WeakAgreement(Pub, NRS) assertion could be inter-
preted as follows: if Pub has completed a run of the protocol with NRS, then
NRS has previously been running the protocol, apparently with Pub.
#Specification
Secret(NRS, MID, [Pub])340
Secret(NRS, ObjToken, [Pub])
WeakAgreement(Pub, NRS)
WeakAgreement(NRS, Pub)
Agreement(NRS, Pub, [MID])
The #Actual Variables section defines the types of variables, used in the345
actual system. These are defined in a similar way to the #Free Variables.
#Actual variables
pub, nrs, Mallory : Agent
Na, Nb, Seq2, N1 : Nonce
mID: MessageID350
k1, k2: PreSharedKey
tkg: Server
InverseKeys = (k1, k1),(k2, k2)
EIDpre: EIDPrefix
M, M2, ack: Messages355
haash1: HashValues
16
Figure 5: The Verification Result
subToken: SubjectToken
objToken: ObjectToken
The functions used by the agents in the #Free Variables section will be
defined under the #Functions heading.360
#Functions
symbolic SK, PK
The # Intruder Information heading specifies the intruder identity, knowl-
edge and capability. The first line identifies the intruder as Mallory, the intruder
knowledge defines the Intruder’s initial knowledge, i.e., we assume that the in-365
truder knows the identity of the participants, all public keys, its own private
key and can fabricate Register-Request and Register-Response messages.
#Intruder Information
Intruder = Mallory
IntruderKnowledge = {Pub, NRS, Mallory, PK ,SK(Mallory), M, M1}370
After generating the CSP description of the systems using Casper and asking
FDR to check the security assertions, no attack was found against the proposed
solution as shown in Fig 5.
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5.2.2. Security Analysis:
Despite the fact that no attack has been discovered against the proposed so-375
lution in section 5.2.1, this result needs to be considered carefully. The formal
verification result is based on the system defined in 5.1. In this system, it is as-
sumed that the Pub knows the authoritative NRS in its network or domain. In
a very similar way to the current Domain Naming System (DNS), where clients
are preconfigured with the authoritative DNS server. However, we simulated the380
case when the Pub is not sure of the identity of its authoritative NRS. The fol-
lowing attack against the Secret(NRS, MID, [Pub]) and Agreement(NRS, Pub,
[MID]) is discovered.
1a. TKG → I Pub : {SK(Pub)}{K1}
1b. I TKG → Pub : {SK(Pub)}{K1}385
2a. TKG → I NRS : {SK(NRS)}{K1}
2b. I TKG → NRS : {SK(NRS)}{K1}
3a. Pub→ I Pub : {M, Pub, MID} {PK(Mallory)}, {h(M, Pub, MID)}{SK(Pub)}
3b. I Pub→NRS : {M2, Pub, MID}{PK(NRS)}, {h(M, Pub, MID)}{SK(Pub)}
4. NRS→ I Pub : {M2, MID, objToken} {PK(Pub)}, {h(M2, MID, h(subToken))}390
{SK(NRS)}
The intruder knows MID
Where the notations I NRS, I Pub and I TKG represent the case where the
Intruder impersonates the NRS, Pub and TKG, respectively. This is an active
Man-in-the-Middle attack; the Intruder intercepts and replays messages 1 and395
2. Since the Pub is not sure of the identity of the NRS, the intruder manages to
impersonate the NRS and fools the Pub to use its (rather than the NRS’s) public
key to encrypt message 3a. Consequently, the message ID will be compromised,
and the Pub will run the protocol mistakenly believing it is with the NRS, while
in reality it is with the Intruder. As a consequences of this attack, the intruder400
will be able get the name/location binding at the publication stage and mix
them in away to deny subscribers from getting the requested data and hence
launch a DoS attack.
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There are two ways to stop such attack: firstly using an out-of-band approach
in which the Pubs should be pre-configured to use the an authoritative NRS405
in its domain or network. This could be simply achieved during the network
configuration in a similar way to configuring the default DNS server or the
default gateway in a network. Secondly, by requesting the NRS to explicitly
identify and authenticate itself to the Pub via providing a digital certificate
that could be verified by a trusted third party such as the TKG or a Certificate410
Authority (CA).
5.3. The Authorization and Access Control
During the Registration Stage, once a party (subscriber or publishers) is
authenticated, the NRS will generate a security token. Two types of tokens
are generated: Object Tokens, attached with the published NDOs and Subject415
Tokens attached with subscribers. These tokens define objects and subjects
abilities. An ability is represented as a dot-separated sequence of numbers,
called a label. So, an ability is a string .i1.i2.i3......in for some value n where
i1, i2, i3....., in are integers. Examples of abilities are .1.2.3, .4, or 10.0.0.5. Upon
successful registration, both NDOs (objects) and subscribers (subjects) will be420
given labels (abilities). Access for an NDO is given if the NDO’s label is a
prefix of the subscriber’s label. For instance, an NDO with a label ”.3” could
only be accessed by subscribers with abilities like ”.3.1”, ”.3.2.3”, ”.3.1.2”...etc.
This way, whenever an authenticated subscriber requests an NDO, he needs to
present the right label that confirms his right to access the NDO.425
With the proposed protocol in section 5.2, labels are generated by the NRS so
subscribers can not promote themselves to access other NDOs. Furthermore, to
maintain the integrity of the labels and making sure they have not be tampered
with, labels are integrated in a security tokens (SubToken, ObjToken) which are
hashed and digitally signed by the NRS. Additionally, the security tokens are430
time stamped and have expiry date after which new tokens are needed. When
generating the token, it should be noted that no Subtokens have a validity period
longer than that of the corresponding ObjToken. Using the time stamp and the
19
expiry time will minimize the risk of a both active and passive replay attacks.
6. Conclusion435
Building a scalable information-centric architecture involves several chal-
lenges. This includes the development of an information model and a naming
framework which support efficient information dissemination with improved se-
curity properties. The NetInf is a promising architecture for data dissemination
and retrieval that is based on the Publish/Subscribe model. In this model, pub-440
lishers publish their data (through the Publication stage) to the NRS system
which then launch these data to subscribers upon request (through the Data
Retrieval Stage). This papers explains how the Publication Stage might be
vulnerable to masquerading and content poisoning attacks which might happen
when an unauthenticated node publishes invalid data to the system. The paper445
also highlights the issue of an authorized access to published data. To address
these challenges, an integrated authentication and authorization approach is
proposed in the paper. While the proposed authentication protocol is based on
the IBC protocol and achieves mutual authentication between publishers and
the NetInf system, the proposed authorization approach is based on cap(ability)450
access policy. The proposed approaches have been formally verified using formal
method approach.
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